diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_command_shell_fetch_env_variables.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_list_env_variables_via_set_command_from_uncommon_parent.yml
similarity index 67%
rename from detections/endpoint/windows_command_shell_fetch_env_variables.yml
rename to detections/endpoint/windows_list_env_variables_via_set_command_from_uncommon_parent.yml
index 156004d4aa..c2ca59a1d5 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/windows_command_shell_fetch_env_variables.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_list_env_variables_via_set_command_from_uncommon_parent.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,18 @@
-name: Windows Command Shell Fetch Env Variables
+name: Windows List ENV Variables Via SET Command From Uncommon Parent
 id: 048839e4-1eaa-43ff-8a22-86d17f6fcc13
-version: 3
-date: '2024-09-30'
+version: 4
+date: '2025-01-17'
 author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
 status: production
-type: TTP
-description: The following analytic identifies a suspicious process command line fetching environment variables with a non-shell parent process. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and parent process names. This activity is significant as it is commonly associated with malware like Qakbot, which uses this technique to gather system information. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate that the parent process has been compromised, potentially allowing attackers to execute arbitrary commands, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment.
+type: Anomaly
+description: The following analytic identifies a suspicious process command line fetching environment variables using the cmd.exe "set" command, with a non-shell parent process. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and parent process names. This activity could be significant as it is commonly associated with malware like Qakbot, which uses this technique to gather system information. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate that the parent process has been compromised, potentially allowing attackers to execute arbitrary commands, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment.
 data_source:
 - Sysmon EventID 1
 - Windows Event Log Security 4688
 - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "*cmd /c set" OR Processes.process = "*cmd.exe /c set" AND NOT (Processes.parent_process_name = "cmd.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "powershell*" OR Processes.parent_process_name="pwsh.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "explorer.exe") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_command_shell_fetch_env_variables_filter`'
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name="cmd.exe" Processes.process IN ("*/c set", "*/c \"set") AND NOT Processes.parent_process_name IN ("cmd.exe", "explorer.exe", "powershell*" "pwsh.exe") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_list_env_variables_via_set_command_from_uncommon_parent_filter`'
 how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
-known_false_positives: shell process that are not included in this search may cause False positive. Filter is needed.
+known_false_positives: shell process that are not included in this search may cause False positive. Filter as needed.
 references:
 - https://twitter.com/pr0xylife/status/1585612370441031680?s=46&t=Dc3CJi4AnM-8rNoacLbScg
 drilldown_searches:
@@ -28,9 +28,9 @@ tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Qakbot
   asset_type: Endpoint
-  confidence: 70
-  impact: 80
-  message: non-shell parent process has a child process $process_name$ with a commandline $process$ to fetch env variables in $dest$
+  confidence: 50
+  impact: 50
+  message: $parent_process_name$ Spawned $process_name$ with a commandline $process$ in $dest$
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1055
   observable:
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ tags:
   - Processes.parent_process_path
   - Processes.process_path
   - Processes.parent_process_id
-  risk_score: 56
+  risk_score: 25
   security_domain: endpoint
 tests:
 - name: True Positive Test