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Merge pull request #3005 from nterl0k/nterl0k-t1036-lolbash-your-face
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Nterl0k - T1036 LOLBASh Your Face
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ljstella authored Jul 26, 2024
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68 changes: 68 additions & 0 deletions detections/endpoint/windows_lolbas_executed_as_renamed_file.yml
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name: Windows LOLBAS Executed As Renamed File
id: fd496996-7d9e-4894-8d40-bb85b6192dc6
version: 1
date: '2024-04-30'
author: Steven Dick
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic identifies a LOLBAS process being executed where it's process name does not match it's original file name attribute. Processes that have been renamed and executed may be an indicator that an adversary is attempting to evade defenses or execute malicious code. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code.
data_source:
- Sysmon EID 1
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` latest(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process, latest(Processes.process) as process, latest(Processes.process_guid) as process_guid count, min(_time) AS firstTime, max(_time) AS lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where NOT Processes.original_file_name IN("-","unknown") AND NOT Processes.process_path IN ("*\\Program Files*","*\\PROGRA~*","*\\Windows\\System32\\*","*\\Windows\\Syswow64\\*") BY Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_path
|`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| where NOT match(process_name, "(?i)".original_file_name)
| lookup lolbas_file_path lolbas_file_name as original_file_name OUTPUT description as desc
| search desc!="false"
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_lolbas_executed_as_renamed_file_filter`'
how_to_implement: To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process name and process original file name, such as with Sysmon EID 1.
known_false_positives: A certain amount of false positives are likely with this detection. MSI based installers often trigger for SETUPAPL.dll and vendors will often copy system exectables to a different path for application usage.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/
tags:
analytic_story:
- Living Off The Land
- Masquerading - Rename System Utilities
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 50
impact: 80
message: The file originally named $original_file_name$ was executed as $process_name$ on $dest$
mitre_attack_id:
- T1036
- T1036.003
- T1218.011
observable:
- name: dest
type: Hostname
role:
- Victim
- name: user
type: User
role:
- Victim
- name: process_name
type: Process Name
role:
- Attacker
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- Processes.user
- Processes.dest
- Processes.parent_process_name
- Processes.process_name
- Processes.original_file_name
- Processes.process_path
risk_score: 40
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036/cmd_lolbas_usage/cmd_lolbas_usage.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
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name: Windows LOLBAS Executed Outside Expected Path
id: 326fdf44-b90c-4d2e-adca-1fd140b10536
version: 1
date: '2024-04-29'
author: Steven Dick
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic identifies a LOLBAS process being executed outside of it's expected location. Processes being executed outside of expected locations may be an indicator that an adversary is attempting to evade defenses or execute malicious code. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code.
data_source:
- Sysmon EID 1
- Windows Security EID 4688
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` latest(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process, latest(Processes.process) as process, latest(Processes.process_guid) as process_guid count, min(_time) AS firstTime, max(_time) AS lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process != "unknown" AND NOT Processes.process_path IN ("*\\Program Files*","*\\PROGRA~*","*\\Windows\\System32\\*","*\\Windows\\Syswow64\\*") BY Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
|`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| lookup lolbas_file_path lolbas_file_name as process_name OUTPUT description as desc
| lookup lolbas_file_path lolbas_file_name as process_name lolbas_file_path as process_path OUTPUT description as is_lolbas_path
| search desc!="false" AND is_lolbas_path="false"
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_lolbas_executed_outside_expected_path_filter`'
how_to_implement: To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process name and process path, such as with Sysmon EID 1.
known_false_positives: Vendors will often copy system exectables to a different path for application usage.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005/
tags:
analytic_story:
- Living Off The Land
- Masquerading - Rename System Utilities
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 50
impact: 80
message: The user $user$ executed a LOLBAS [$process_name$] from an unexpected location on $dest$
mitre_attack_id:
- T1036
- T1036.005
- T1218.011
observable:
- name: user
type: User
role:
- Victim
- name: dest
type: Hostname
role:
- Victim
- name: process_name
type: Process Name
role:
- Attacker
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- Processes.user
- Processes.dest
- Processes.parent_process_name
- Processes.process_name
- Processes.original_file_name
- Processes.process_path
risk_score: 40
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036/cmd_lolbas_usage/cmd_lolbas_usage.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
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